Rationality and the Structure of the Self

Contents of Volume I: The Humean Conception

• Title Page
• Dedication
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgements
• Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics
• 1. Transpersonal Rationality and Power
• 2. Transpersonal Rationality as Philosophical Virtue
• 3. Philosophical Rationality: Transpersonal or Egocentric?
• 4. Philosophy, Power, and Historical Circumstance
• 5. Philosophy as Exemplar of Transpersonal Rationality
• 6. The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics
• 7. Rationality and the Structure of the Self
• 7.1. Two Conceptions of the Self
• 7.2. Volume I: The Humean Conception
• 7.2.1. The Two Models
• 7.2.2. Three Metaethical Problems
• 7.2.3. Hume Himself
• 7.3. Volume II: A Kantian Conception
• 7.3.1. A First Critique Analysis of Transpersonal Rationality
• 7.3.2. A First Critique Analysis of Pseudorationality
• 7.3.3. Some Advantages and Limitations of the Kantian Alternative
• Endnotes to Chapter I
• Chapter II. The Belief-Desire Model of Motivation
• 1. Orthodox and Revisionist Variants
• 1.1. Brandt and Kim's Ambivalence
• 1.2. Goldman's Orthodoxy
• 1.3. Lewis's Revisionism
• 2. Desire and Externality
• 2.1. A Representational Analysis of Desire
• 2.2. A Representational Analysis of Aversion
• 2.3. Funnel Vision
• 2.4. Attachment and Self-Hatred
• 3. Desire and Instrumentality
• 3.1. The Instrumentalization of Belief
• 3.2. The Instrumentalization Dilemma
• 3.3. The Instrumentalization of the Self
• 3.4. The Puppeteer Fallacy
• 4. The Veracity of the Model
• Endnotes to Chapter II
• Chapter III. The Utility-Maximizing Model of Rationality: Philosophical Interpretations
• 1. Formulating the Principle
• 2. The Single End Interpretation of (U)
• 3. The Coherence Set Interpretation of (U)
• 3.1. Coherence
• 3.2. Nonvacuity
• 3.3. Universality
• 4. Three Interpretations of "Utility"
• 4.1. The Phenomenological Interpretation
• 4.2. The Psychoanalytic Interpretation
• 4.3. The Behavioral Interpretation
• Endnotes to Chapter III
• Chapter IV. The Utility-Maximizing Model of Rationality: Decision-Theoretic Interpretations
• 1. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
• 1.1. The Social Utility Function
• 1.2. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern Cardinal Measure
• 1.3. Interpersonal Cardinality
• 1.4. Allais on Psychological Value
• 1.5. The Allais Paradox
• 1.6. Preference and Probability
• 1.6.1. Aggregate Value and the Sorites Paradox
• 1.6.2. Sorites, Cyclicity and the vN-M Axioms
• 2. The Ramsey-Savage Concept of a Simple Ordering
• 2.1. Ramsey’s Value Axioms
• 2.2. Consistency and Intensionality
• 2.3. Vacuity and Cyclicity
• 3. Transitivity
• 3.1. Minimal Psychological Consistency
• 3.2. Logical Consistency
• 4. The Utility-Maximizing Ideal
• 5. Efficiency vs. Ethics
• Endnotes to Chapter IV
• Chapter V. A Refutation of Anscombe's Thesis
• 1. Values and Practice
• 1.1. Value Theory
• 1.2. Practical Decision-Making
• 1.3. Kant's Mixed Theory
• 1.4. Aristotle's Mixed Theory
• 2. Practice Re-examined
• 2.1. Classical Utilitarianism
• 2.2. Ross' Intuitionism
• 2.3. Consequences, Intrinsic Value and Moral Beliefs
• 2.4. Prescriptive Indeterminacy
• 3. Value Theory Re-examined
• 3.1. Interchangeability
• 3.2. Metaethical Convention
• 3.3. Structural Equivalence
• 3.3.1. Metaphysical Indistinguishability
• 3.3.2. Provisional Value
• 3.3.3. Causation
• 4. Two Metaethical Attitudes
• 5. "Consequentialism" and the Humean Conception of the Self
• Endnotes to Chapter V
• Chapter VI. The Problem of Moral Motivation
• 1. Self-Interest and Other-Direction
• 1.1. Personal vs. Impersonal Desire
• 1.2. Other-Direction
• 1.3. Interests in vs. of a Self
• 2. Rawls on Moral Motivation
• 2.1.Object-Dependent Desires
• 2.2. Principle-Dependent Desires
• 2.3. Rawls versus Kant
• 3. Desire-Satisfaction and Personal Gain
• 3.1. Pleasure
• 3.2. Self-Direction vs. Self-Interest
• 3.3. Criterion-Satisfaction
• 4. Malevolent Other-Directed Desires
• 4.1. Brutalization
• 4.2. Sadism and Self-Brutalization
• 4.3. Malice
• 5. Desire-Satisfaction and the Moral Interests of a Self
• 5.1. Moral Considerations
• 5.2. Whistle-Blowers, Etc.
• 5.3. Psychological Egoism Again
• Endnotes to Chapter VI
• Chapter VII. Nagel's Internalism
• 1. Nagel versus Kant
• 1.1. The Kantian Dilemma
• 1.2. Two Self-Conceptions
• 2. Prudence
• 2.1. Transpersonal Rationality and Action
• 2.2. Nagel's Version of the Belief-Desire Model of Motivation
• 2.3. Motivated versus Unmotivated Desires
• 2.4. Means-End Reasoning and the Extraordinary Interpretation
• 2.5. Tensed versus Tenseless Judgments
• 2.6. Motivational Content and the Extraordinary Interpretation
• 3. Altruism
• 3.1. Motivational Action at a Distance
• 3.2. Objectivity and Impersonality
• 3.3. Objectivity and Motivational Content
• 3.4. Accepting a Justification
• 3.5. Rational Inescapability and the Kantian Dilemma
• Endnotes to Chapter VII
• Chapter VIII. The Problem of Rational Final Ends
• 1. The Structural Model
• 2. The Infinite Regress: Frankfurt's Humeanism
• 2.1. Self-Evaluation
• 2.2. Moral Paralysis
• 2.3. Unthinkability
• 3. Two Bipartite Conceptions of the Self
• 3.1. Moral Paralysis: Watson's Platonism
• 3.2. Moral Alienation: Williams' Anti-Rationalism
• 3.2.1. Williams' Thesis
• 3.2.1.1. Ground Projects
• 3.2.1.2. The Moral Point of View
• 3.2.1.3. Integrity and Alienation
• 3.2.2. Moral Theory
• 3.2.2.1. Structure
• 3.2.2.2. Personal Investment (Attachment Revisited)
• 3.2.2.3. Universalistic Principles
• 3.2.2.4. Slote on the Rationality of Pure Time Preference
• 3.2.3. The Impersonal Point of View
• 3.2.4. Narcissism
• 3.2.5. Self-Evaluation and Moral Paralysis Reconsidered
• Endnotes to Chapter VIII
• Chapter IX. The Problem of Moral Justification
• 1. Anderson’s Noncognitivism
• 1.1. Expressive States
• 1.2. Expressive Norms
• 1.3. Making Sense of Value
• 1.4. Making Sense of Oneself
• 2. Deductivism
• 3. Gewirth's Deductivism
• 3.1. Justification
• 3.2. Derivation
• 3.3. Voluntariness
• 3.4. Purposiveness
• 3.5. Dialectical Necessity
• 3.6. Generic Goods
• 4. Instrumentalism
• 4.1. Instrumentalism and Objectivity
• 4.2. Justification
• 4.3. The Incredible Shrinking Means
• 4.4. The Problem of Moral Justification
• Endnotes to Chapter IX
• Chapter X. Rawls' Instrumentalism
• 1. The Analogy with Science
• 2. Traditional Social Contract Theory
• 2.1. The Normative Theory
• 2.2. The Metaethical Justification
• 3. A Theory of Justice
• 3.1. Rawls' Metaethics
• 3.1.1. The Original Position
• 3.1.2. The Parties' Psychology
• 3.2. Rawls' Normative Theory
• 3.2.1. The Two Principles of Justice
• 3.2.2. Primary Goods
• 4. Habermas’ Critique
• 4.1. Primary Goods
• 4.2. The Four-Stage Sequence
• 4.3. The Moral Point of View
• 5. The Analogy with Science Reconsidered
• 5.1. Pure Procedural Justice
• 5.2. Wide Reflective Equilibrium
• 6. The Continuity Thesis
• 7. Rawls' Instrumentalism
• 8. The Discontinuity Thesis
• 9. Personal Identity and Wide Reflective Equilibrium
• 10. Moral Objectivity and Pure Procedural Justice
• Endnotes to Chapter X
• Chapter XI. Brandt's Instrumentalism
• 1. Brandt and Rawls
• 2. Brandt's Theory of Justification
• 3. Desire
• 4. Rational Desire
• 5. Prudence
• 6. Irrational Desire
• 7. The Rationality of Benevolence
• 8. Cognitive Psychotherapy Reconsidered
• Endnotes to Chapter XI
• Chapter XII. Classical Utilitarianism and the Free Rider
• 1. Sidgwick and Hobbes on Publicity
• 2. Sidgwick and Mill on Secrecy
• 3. The Pre-Ideal Act-Utilitarian Society
• 4. Hodgson, Gibbard, and Lewis on theIdeal Act-Utilitarian Society
• 5. The Social Utility of Free Riding
• Endnotes to Chapter XI
• Chapter XIII. Baier's Hume
• 1. Baier's Humeanism
• 1.1. The Order of Exposition and the Order of Thought
• 1.2. The Object of Exposition and the Object of Experience
• 1.3. Baier’s Project
• 2. Baier's Critique of Social Contract Theory
• 3. Baier's Case for Hume over Kant
• 4. An Assessment of Baier's Critique
• 5. Baier's Analysis of Trust
• 6. An Assessment of Baier's Analysis of Trust
• 7. An Assessment of Baier's "Stylistic Experiment"
• Endnotes to Chapter XIII
• Chapter XIV. Hume’s Metaethics
• 1. Hume's Model of Reason
• 2. Hume's Model of Motivation
• 3. The Passions from the Viewpoint of Reason
• 4. The Principles of Variability
• 5. The Principles of Stability and the Objective Perspective
• 6. The Rationality of Final Ends
• Endnotes to Chapter XIV
• Chapter XV. Seven Dogmas of Humeanism
• Bibliography
• Index coming soon!

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